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Cross-subsidies and sensitivities 
1. Introduction 
This short report extends the analysis of electrification financing reported in 
"Sustainable financing of electrification in South Africa" by Van Horen and 
Thompson. It aims to further the analysis by reporting on cross-subsidies within 
REDs and by conducting sensitivity analyses on a set of key variables. These 
variables are: 
• the scale of the programme, i.e. the targeted number of connections per 
annum; 
• initial debt load; 
• interest rates; and 
overall consumption growth. 
The variables measured included the maximum D:E ratio and the level of cross-
subsidy implicit in the programme. For REDs where D:E exceeded 1.5, further 
analysis was conducted to determine the level of capital grant support and the 
level of price increase required to make the distributors financially viable. 
2. Financial viability and subsidisation 
The base case results for each of the five REDs, plus the consolidated picture for 
the entire industry, are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Results for a ten-year period 
RED Ave Average Maximum Lowest Maximum Average 
connec- Capex D:E interest debt cross-
tions p.a. p.a. cover subsidy 
Northern 178 083 R740m 11.08 0.05 R6 930m R591m 
Central 85 167 R347m 5.74 0.05 R3 609m R260m 
Eastern 98 750 R417m 0.61 7.27 R1 033m R394m 
Western 34 500 R122m 0.62 7.64 R427m R92m 
Wits 59 250 R200m 0.54 11.63 R825m R122m 
Total 455 750 R1 826m 0.96 1.84 R10 999m R1 459m 
2. 1 Connections and capital costs 
Average connections per annum are high - very close to the peak of the RDP 
programme. In fact, total annual connections in the first five years (1997 to 2001) 
are higher than this - around 600 000, per annum. The need to improve access 
levels in provinces with large rural populations means that the targeted 
connection rates in the model are substantially higher than current practice in the 
Northern RED and the Eastern RED. These connection rates are calculated on the 
basis of target access rates for grid electricity. If these targets are to be met, it 
seems likely that connection rates will have to be spread more evenly over the ten-
year period. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of connection rates per RED for a five-year period 
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Total capit!li costs for the entire country are, on average, R1.8 billion per annum. 
This is approximately 25% higher than has been experienced to date and is caused 
by the increase in capital costs as the programme reaches more rural areas. Figure 
2 compares modelled capital costs on low-income electrification with actual costs 
in 1996. In all cases, modelled capital costs are higher than those experienced to 
date, espedally if a longer time horizon is adopted. While it may be argued that 
this will unjustifiably inflate capital costs, it should be noted that over time capital 
costs (in real terms) are likely to increase substantially as the programme has to 
reach more remote rural areas. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of capital costs per RED 
2.2 Fincncicl viability 
Since this work has defined finandal viability as a maximum D:E of 1.5, it can be 
seen from Table 1 that two of the five REDs are not viable. Northern and Central 
both have a maximum D:E way in excess of the maximum allowed. Similarly, the 
indicator interest cover also indicates that these two distributors are not viable 
without price changes or grants. 
Finandal viability can also be detected in the net income stream, after interest 
payments and transfers to munidpalities. Figure 3 illustrates the trends in income 
streams for each of the five REDs. It can be seen that while the three viable REDs 
have positive income streams for the entire duration of the ten-year period 
presented, the Northern and Central RED generate large net losses. These losses 
are clearly unsustainable and lead to the poor debt equity ratios for these 
distributors. It is noteworthy that for the country as a whole, the total net income 
remains positive for the entire period, and. even begins to grow after the first five 
years. 
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Figure 3: Net income (after interest and transfers to municipalities) 
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It is possible to calculate the level of support which these distributors would 
require to remain viable. Two support mechanisms · were investigated here: 
across-the-board price increases for these two REDs, and grants towards capital 
expenditure. While the former results in revenue increases which are sustained 
throughout the programme, the latter are annual grants which are made on an as-
needs basis. 
For the Northern RED to be viable, a total real price increase of 11 %, spread over 
the fust five years, is required. Alternatively, capital expenditure grants are 
required over a ten-year period, and the present value of these is calculated to be 
R2.2 billion. These grants represent a subsidy of 40% of low-income electrification 
capital expenditure. 
For the Central RED to be viable, price increases totalling 13%, spread over four 
years, are required. The alternative support mechanism, i.e. capital grants, is in 
the same order as for Northern RED, and the present value of these grants is 
calculated as being R2 billion. However, this subsidy represents a very high 
portion (75%) of capital expenditure on electrification for the Central RED. 
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Figure 4: Capital grants required for Central and Northern REDs 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of these capital grants for the two REDs over a 
ten-year period. The total grant· for both REDs is expressed as a percentage of the 
combined net income of the other three REDs, i.e. the level of the tax if these 
grants are to be sourced from within the industry. The 'tax' is high and would no 
doubt impact on the viability of the other REDs. However, if REDs were allowed 
to pass this "tax" through as a price increase, then the average increase (as a 
percentage of revenue) would only be 2% to 3%. 
It is possible to ensure the viability of these two REDs through a combination of 
price increases and capital grants. A once-off price increase o( 5% would reduce 
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the required capital grants substantially. In the case of the Northern RED, no 
additional grants would be required since this initial price increase would be 
adequate to ensure viability. For the Central RED, the total grant would decline to 
only R125 million in present value terms. This level of grant is more easily funded 
through transfers from other REDs. 
2.3 Cross-subsidisation 
While three of the five REDs are financially viable, this does not necessarily mean 
that their electrification programmes as viable as stand-alone programmes. In fact, 
all of the REDs have to cross-subsidise their low-income household electrification 
activities. This cross-subsidy is effected in two ways. Firstly, REDs with a positive 
net income can use some of their cash balances to pay for the capital costs of 
electrification. In the modelling work undertaken here, this occurs for the three 
viable REDs, viz. Eastern, Western and Wits. Secondly, these REDs may still find 
that there are losses associated with their electrification programmes, attributable 
to operating plus any finance changes associated with capital expenditure 
financed by- debt. This occurs for the three viable REDs only in the first few years. 
Thereafter, the internal capital subsidies are sufficient for electrification to be cash 
positive. 
Table 1 shows that the average subsidy required for electrification is around 
R1.4 billion per annum. The three REDs with high rural electrification loads 
account for 85% of this requirement. If this required subsidy is expressed as a 
percentage of total revenue, it varies between 1.8% (for Wits) and 6.9% (for 
Northern). It is interesting to note that, while the Eastern RED requires a high 
level of cross-subsidisation (6.5% of revenues), it remains financially viable 
without price increases or capital grants. This is due to the high level of industrial 
and commercial electricity consumption in the region. 
On a national basis, the over-all cross-subsidy is, averaged over 10 years, 
equivalent to 4.8% of total revenues. This figure is consistent with other estimates 
of the national level of cross-subsidy required by electrification. This modelling 
indicates that a portion of this can be obtained from net income without price 
increases, and the rest must be obtained from additional sources of income, i.e. 
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Figure 5: Losses for low-income household electrification 
3. Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis will examine the following variables: 
the scale of the programme; 
the initial debt load; 
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• interest rates; 
overall consumption growth. 
The intention of the analysis is to determine the robustness of the results. If the 
main conclusions of the analysis remain consistent for all sensitivities, it can then 
be concluded that the results are robust 
3. 1 Sensitivity to scale of programme 
For the two failing REDs, the analysis determined the extent to which the 
programme would have to be scaled down in order for these distributors to be 
finandally viable. 
In the case of the Northern RED, connection rates would have to be scaled down 
to 60% of the original targets, giving average annual connection rates of 120 000 to 
low income households. This is approximately double the level needed to keep up 
with population growth, and implies access levels in the region of 75% after ten 
years. 
Central RED is in a more vulnerable position. For the RED to remain viable, the 
electrification programme would have to be scaled down to only 20% of the base 
case targets. This is equivalent to an average connection rate of only 18 000 per 
annum, which is only half the rate required to maintain current levels of access by 
keep up with population growth. This reduced connection rate gives a total access 
to grid electridty of only 54% after ten years. 
Table 2: Reducing the scale of the programme to ensure viab ility 
Northern RED Central RED 
Connections per Base case 200 000 95 000 
annum 
(for 1st 10 years) Reduced programme 118 000 18 000 
Access atter 1 o years Base case 90% 62% 
Reduced programme 75% 54% 
Percentage the programme is reduced by 41% 81% 
3.2 Sensitivity to initial debt loads 
The base case assumes an initial debt to equity ratio of 1:1. This means that exactly 
50% of the value of assets in. year 1 is financed through debt. This is taken to be a 
fairly strong balance sheet. This assumption means that total debt in the industry 
at the commencement of the RED structure is taken to be R6.2 billion. Under the 
base case; this debt load is found to ~e substantially over the next ten years, to 
R11 billion (in 1996 terms), despite using net income to fund capital expenditure 
where possible. 
Since finandal viability is taken to be a debt to equity ratio less than 1.5, it is 
possible that redistributing the initial debt load may mean that unviable 
distributors become viable, and visa versa. This was tested by varying the initial 
debt to equity ratio for each distributor. In the case of Northern and Central 
REDs, the ratio was set at 1.0, 0.5 and 0.0. In the case of the other three REDs, the 
ratio was set at 1.0, 1.5 and 2.0. 
The analysis shows that the underlying conclusions, i.e. that only Northern and 
Central are unviable, hold. Table 3 presents the results for these two distributors. 
The maximum D:E refers to the maximum level which this parameter reaches 
over a ten-year period. It can be seen that in all cases, this figure is negative, 
which occurs with negative equity, i.e. liabilities are greater than total assets. The 
price increase required to make the two distributors viable is more or less 
constant for all areas. However, the timing of the price increase changes. Where 
there is a low initial debt to equity ratio, the price increase is delayed until later in 
the programme. The grants required to ensure viability decrease as the initial debt 
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load decreases. This is because the model allows the utility to build up debt in the 
early years, thereby reducing the amount which must be made available in grants. 
Table 3: Sensitivity to initial D:E ratio for Northern & Central 
Northern RED Central RED 
Initial Max Price Grants Max Price Grants 
D:E D:E increase required D:E increase required 
0.0 Negative 9.5% R680m Negative 12.4% R1 100m 
0.5 Negative 11 .6% R1 700m Negative 13.9% R1 700m 
1.0 Negative 10.6% R2 200m Negative 13.0% R2 DOOm 
For the other three distributors, it was found that increasing their initial debt load 
made no difference to their viability, although it did decrease net income due to 
the higher interest charges which were associated with the higher initial debt 
levels. In all cases, the debt to equity ratio declines in every year for the entire 
period. The small variation in the debt to equity ratio in year five, as well as the 
relatively small change in net income levels, suggests that the initial starting debt 
is not of great significance to their financial performance. 
Table 4: Sensitivity to initial D:E ratio for Eastern, Western and Wits REDs 
Eastern RED Western RED Wits RED 
Initial D:E Net income D:E Net income D:E Net income 
D:E in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 
1.0 0.17 R750m 0.16 R310m 0.12 R900m 
1.5 0.21 R730m 0.21 R300m 0.15 R880m 
2.0 0.24 R715m 0.24 R295m 0.17 R870m 
3.3 Sensitivity to interest rates 
The third variable examined in the sensitivity analysis was the level of interest 
rates. These were varied by +3% and -3% from the base assumptions for each of 
the REDs. 
For Northern and Central REDs, it can be seen from Table 5 that the change in 
interest rate does not affect the overall viability of the operation, i.e. debt to equity 
ratios remain unacceptable, and each of the two distributors generates negative 
equity unless there are price increases or capital grants. Table 5 also shows the 
price increases or capital grants required if these REDs are to be viable. As would 
be expected, an increase (decrease) in ·the interest rate increases (decreases) the 
amount of support required. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity to interest rates for Northern & Central 
Northern RED Central RED 
Interest Max Price Grants Max Price Grants 
Rate D:E increase required D:E increase required 
-3% Negative 9.0% R1 700m Negative 12.1% R1 700m 
Base Negative 10.6% R2 200m Negative 13.0% R2 OOOm 
+3% Negative 12.2% R2 700m Negative 13.3% R2 200m 
For the other three REDs, changes to interest rates have a relatively small effect on 
their overall profitability. All three REDs remain viable, and changes in interest 
rates (within the band considered here) have only a very small impact on the 
overall financial position. This is because by year five, these distributors have very 
small debt levels in comparison with their revenue base. 
Table 6: Sensitivity to interest rates for Eastern, Western and Wits REDs 
Eastern RED Western RED Wits RED 
Interest D:E Net income D:E Net income D:E Net income 
rate in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 
-3% 0.17 R710m 0.16 R310m 0.12 R870m 
Base 0.17 R750m 0.16 R310m 0.12 R900m 
+3% 0.16 R800m 0.16 R310m 0.12 R930m 
3.4 Sensitivity to overall consumption growth 
Estimates were made in the base case for consumption growth in each of the main 
categories. While the same assumptions were applied to each RED, the different 
structure of 1 the customer base in each case meant that overall consumption 
growth was different for each distributor. The results of this are presented in 
Table 7 where it can be seen that all REDs have a gro'Yth rate of around 3.5%, 
except for Central where the growth is only 2.4%. This is due to the relatively high 
proportion of mining demand in this RED. 
Table 7: Consum~tion growth rates per customer class and RED 
Customer class Growth rate RED Overall growth rate 
Agriculture 2.0% Northern 3.5% 
Mining 2.0% Central 2.4% 
Manufacturing 3.8% Eastern 3.6% 
Commercial 4.0% Western 3.6% 
Transport 3.0% Wits 3.4% 
General 3.0% Total 3.3% 
In the sensitivity analyses, the consumption growth rate was set at 2.5%, 3.5% and 
4.5%. The results for Northern and Central are presented in Table 8. It can be seen 
that changes in overall consumption growth have a relatively minor effect on the 
overall viability of these distributors. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity to consumption growth for Northern & Central 
Northern RED Central RED 
Consum Max Price Grants Max Price Grants 
growth D:E increase required D:E increase required 
2.5% Negative 11.8% R2 500m Negative 13.0% R2 DOOm 
3.5% Negative 10.6% R2 200m Negative 12.2% R1 950m 
4.5% Negative 9.6% R1 900m Negative 11.6% R1 850m 
For the other three REDs, changes in consumption growth have a similarly small 
effect on their overall finandal position, as can be seen in Table 9. 
Table 9: Sensitivity to consumption growth for Eastern, Western and Wits REDs 
Eastern RED Western RED Wits RED 
Con sum D:E Net income D:E Net income D:E Net income 
growth in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 in year 5 - in year 5 in year 5 
2.5% 0.17 R740m 0.16 R300m 0.12 R870m 
3.5% 0.17 R750m 0.16 R310m 0.12 R900m 
4.5% 0.16 R770m 0.16 R330m 0.12 R930m 
4. Conclusions 
The results of this sensitivity analysis show that, in general, the overall 
conclusions of the study are robust. That is,- reasonable changes to the base 
assumption do not affect the main conclusions of the study, at least with respect 
to changes U: the initial debt load, interest rates and consumption growth. 
This imphes that the finandal viability of the REDs hes in the structure of the 
system. In other words, the underlying factors which determine the finandal 
trends in these distributors relate to their geographical scope, pridng structure 
and the scope of electrification duties imposed on them. 
It may be possible for the finandal performance of the two failing REDs to be 
improved by changing RED boundaries. However, in order to do so, it is 
necessary to assodate regions with a heavy rural electrification load with an 
urban/industrial load centre. Given the geographical constraints in doing this, it 
seems unhkely that all REDs will be finandally viable. 
The alternative options are: 
1) to reduce the electrification load on these distributors; 
2) increase prices substantially in these distributors 
3) to arrange finandal transfers to cover a portion of capital costs in these REDs; 
and 
4) a combination of the preceding options. 
Even if options 1 or 2 are adopted, it seems inevitable that some form of capital 
subsidies will be required. The scale of price increases seems too high to be 
acceptable, and the option of redudng electrification targets would seem to be 
pohtically unacceptable. 
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